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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
On appeal, Mr. Johnson asserts that the district court erred when, over his 
objection under Idaho Rule of Evidence 403, it admitted four autopsy photographs 
without conducting the balancing test required under the Rule. He also asserts that the 
district court abused its discretion when it imposed a life sentence, with fifteen years 
fixed, following his conviction for murder in the second degree, and when it denied his 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion in light of the new information 
provided in support thereof. 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State disputes all three assignments of error. As 
relevant to this Reply Brief, with respect to the Rule 403 claim, the State argues, inter 
alia, that Mr. Johnson "fails to cite to any authority for the proposition that a trial court is 
required to conduct its prejudice analysis on the record," and cites to a case it says 
supports its contention that such an analysis need not be conducted on the record. The 
State also argues that, even assuming such an analysis must be conducted on the 
record, "the record in this case clearly reflects" that such an analysis was conducted. 
This Reply Brief is necessary to explain that the case cited by the State for the 
proposition that a Rule 403 analysis need not be conducted on the record actually says 
the opposite, and that the required analysis was not conducted on the record with 
respect to the photographs that were admitted. With respect to the remaining 
arguments, Mr. Johnson will rely on the arguments set forth in his Appellant's Brief. 
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Johnson's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference. 
2 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err when, over Mr. Johnson's Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 
objection, it admitted four autopsy photographs without conducting the balancing test 
required under the Rule? 
3 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When, Over Mr. Johnson's Idaho Rule Of Evidence 403 
Objection, It Admitted Four Autopsy Photographs Without Conducting The Balancing 
Test Required Under The Rule 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State provides two arguments in opposing 
Mr. Johnson's claim of error with respect to his objection under Idaho Rule of Evidence 
403. Neither argument is well-taken. Additionally, because the State does not argue 
that any error was harmless, this Court must reverse and remand for a new trial if it 
finds error. 
First, the State argues, 
Johnson fails to cite to any authority for the proposition that a trial court is 
required to conduct its prejudice analysis on the record. While a court 
undoubtedly must conduct the weighing required by I.R.E. 403 before 
excluding evidence, this does not mean a court errs in failing to explain its 
prejudice analysis on the record. See State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469,471, 
248 P.3d 720, 722 (2010). 
(Respondent's Brief, p.9 (emphasis added).) 
The State's argument fails because the case it cites, Ruiz, actually holds the 
opposite of what the State maintains it does. In Ruiz, the Idaho Supreme Court 
considered whether the district court erred when, in sustaining the State's Rule 403 
objection, it prevented defense counsel from cross-examining the State's key witness 
concerning the terms of a plea bargain through which the witness avoided a mandatory 
minimum prison sentence. In reaching its decision that the district court erred, the Court 
explained, 
To exclude evidence under Rule 403, the trial court must address whether 
the probative value is substantially outweighed by one of the 
considerations listed in the Rule. Meister, 148 Idaho at 241, 220 P.3d at 
1060. The district court here did not conduct that analysis. It merely said, 
"You can't talk about minimum mandatories." After Ruiz's counsel 
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objected, the court added, "I think that the court has a delicate line to walk 
between what you are allowed to do in terms of credibility and the fact that 
the jury is not to be advised of the penalties that the defendant might face, 
if convicted." Because it excluded the evidence without conducting the 
analysis required by Rule 403, the district court erred. 
Ruiz, 150 Idaho at 471 (emphasis added). Because Ruiz does not support the State's 
argument, and in fact supports Mr. Johnson's argument, the State's argument on this 
point must be rejected. 
Second, the State argues, 
[E]ven assuming the record must reveal some indication that the trial court 
conducted a 403 analysis, the record in this case clearly reflects as much. 
Indeed, as Johnson acknowledges, his objection to the evidence was that 
it was unfairly prejudicial. (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) The district court's 
comments clearly indicate an understanding of the objection and analysis 
of the admissibility of the photographs in light of their "inflammatory" 
nature, including citation to the appropriate legal standard. (10/25/2011 
Tr., p.13, L.22 - p.15, L.13, p.400, L.4 - p.406, L.3.) The court even 
warned the jurors they would be shown "somewhat graphic" and 
"[un]pleasant" pictures but admonished them not to allow the "potential 
inflammatory nature" of the pictures to "cloud [their] judgment in 
determining what happens." (Trial Tr., p.414, L.16 - p.415, L.17.) The 
court obviously would not give such an instruction had it been unaware of 
and failed to consider the prejudicial nature of the photographs in 
determining their admissibility. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.10 (brackets in original).) 
The first problem with the State's argument is that it cites to no case law. The 
second is that it appears to be nothing more than additional argument in support of the 
State's first argument, namely, that no analysis is required to be conducted on the 
record when a Rule 403 objection is raised. Next, it is unclear why the fact that the 
court may have understood Mr. Johnson's objection but failed to follow the procedure 
required by the objection somehow cures any error in admitting the items for which no 
analysis was offered. Additionally, despite the fact that the district court may have 
5 
employed the standard correctly with respect to one photograph that it properly 
excluded, and cited to the correct legal standard in doing so, that has no bearing on 
whether the district court erred when it failed to conduct the necessary balancing test on 
the record with respect to the photographs that it admitted. Furthermore, the fact that 
the district court may have acknowledged the inflammatory nature of the photographs 
does nothing to indicate how it balanced the prejudicial nature of the photographs 
against their probative value. Finally, the fact that the district court instructed the jury 
not to allow emotion to cloud their judgment in light of the "potential[ly] inflammatory 
nature" of the photographs does nothing to establish that the district court conducted the 
obligatory balancing test on the record. 
Finally, the State does not argue, much less establish beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that any error was harmless. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-11.) Therefore, if this 
Court finds that the district court erred in admitting the photographs over Mr. Johnson's 
Rule 403 objection, it must reverse the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter 
for a new trial. See Ruiz, 150 Idaho at 471 ("The State has not argued that the error 
was harmless. Therefore, we vacate the judgment of conviction."); see also State v. 
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, and in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Johnson 
respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment of conviction and remand this 
matter to the district court for a new trial. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that this 
Court reduce his sentence to a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed. 
DATED this 20th day of May, 2013. 
SR.ENGER J. HAHN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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